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I. INTRODUCTION
During the Survey year, Illinois courts and the Illinois General
Assembly addressed a variety of insurance issues. The Illinois
Supreme Court considered issues relating to insurance company
liquidations, the measure of an insured's remedy for an insurer's
failure to offer its insured underinsured motorist coverage, and the
enforcement of premium due notice requirements in a life insur-
ance forfeiture. The Illinois appellate courts resolved important
issues regarding the interpretation of the pollution exclusion in the
comprehensive general liability policy and the extent to which lia-
bility insurance will cover the repair or replacement of a defective
component product manufactured by the insured. Finally, the Illi-
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nois General Assembly passed legislation mandating that motorists
carry liability insurance on all vehicles registered in Illinois.
II. THE PRIORITY STATUS OF REINSUREDS IN THE
LIQUIDATION PROCEEDINGS OF INSOLVENT
REINSURERS
When a large commercial enterprise is declared bankrupt, com-
plicated issues often arise with respect to the priority of claims
against the debtor corporation. In the case of insurance compa-
nies, which are exempt from the application of federal bankruptcy
laws, I these issues typically are governed by state statute.2 The Illi-
nois liquidation statute provides that an insurer's "policyholders"
have a higher priority status than do general creditors. In In re
Liquidations of Reserve Insurance Co. ,' the Illinois Supreme Court
construed the Illinois liquidation statute and held that reinsurance5
claims have a lower priority status in the distribution of an insol-
vent insurer's assets than do "direct insurance ' 6 claims.'
In Reserve Insurance, the Illinois Director of Insurance ("Direc-
tor"), acting as the liquidator' in the liquidation proceedings of
Reserve Insurance Company and Security Casualty Company, suc-
cessfully petitioned the circuit court to declare that all reinsurance
claims filed by insurance companies ("reinsureds") were claims of
"general creditors" under section 205(l)(d) of the liquidation stat-
ute.9 In a direct appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court,' 0 the rein-
1. See 11 U.S.C. § 109 (1982).
2. See generally 2A G. COUCH, R. ANDERSON & M. RHODES, COUCH ON INSUR-
ANCE § 22.52 (2d ed. rev. 1984)(explaining the general scope of such statutes and the
state interests involved).
3. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, para. 817 (1987). For the pertinent text of this statute, see
infra note 9.
4. 122 Ill. 2d 555, 524 N.E.2d 538 (1988) [hereinafter Reserve Insurance].
5. Reinsurance is defined as: "A contract by which an insurer procures a third per-
son to insure him against loss or liability by reason of original insurance. A contract that
one insurer makes with another to protect the latter from a risk already assumed ......
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1157 (5th ed. 1979).
6. The term "direct insurance," as used by the court, is perhaps best understood by
reference to the definition of reinsurance. See supra note 5. Direct insurance is the "orig-
inal insurance" or the "risk already assumed" referred to in that definition.
7. Reserve Ins., 122 Ill. 2d at 563-64, 524 N.E.2d at 542.
8. Upon court order directing the liquidation of an insurance company, the Director
is authorized to liquidate the company. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, para. 805 (1987).
9. Reserve Ins., 122 Ill. 2d at 557-58, 524 N.E.2d at 539. The liquidation statute
provides, in pertinent part:
Distribution of general assets from company's estate - Priorities
(1) The priorities of distribution of general assets from the company's estate is to be as
follows:
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sureds argued that they were "policyholders" covered under
"insurance policies" or "insurance contracts" issued by Reserve
and that they were therefore entitled to the higher priority status of
section 205(l)(c) ("priority (c)") of the liquidation statute.II
In affirming the circuit court's decision, the Illinois Supreme
Court first drew a sharp distinction between reinsurance and direct
insurance.1 2 The court stressed that reinsurance agreements, un-
like direct insurance contracts, are negotiated between parties in
relatively equal bargaining positions.' 3 The court further empha-
sized that reinsurance contracts remain distinct from and uncon-
nected to direct policies.' 4 Additionally, the Reserve Insurance
court observed that reinsurance protects against insurance liability
rather than the hazards commonly associated with contracts of di-
rect insurance.' 5
Consistent with these differences, the court observed that the Il-
linois Insurance Code makes specific reference to reinsurance,"6 at
least twice within the same statute-, provision as the word "insur-
(a) The costs and expenses of administration ....
(b) Wages actually owing to employees for services rendered . . . and secured
claims ....
(c) Claims by policyholders, beneficiaries, insureds and liability claims against
insureds covered under insurance policies and insurance contracts issued by the
company, and claims of the Illinois Insurance Guaranty Fund, the Illinois Life and
Health Guaranty Association and any similar organization in another state ....
(d) All other claims of general creditors not falling within any other priority
under this Section ....
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, para. 817 (1987).
The record in the Reserve Insurance case reveals that if the reinsureds were classified as
"general creditors" pursuant to priority (d), then it is likely that they would have recov-
ered nothing for their claims. Reserve Ins., 122 Ill. 2d at 558, 524 N.E.2d at 539. On the
other hand, if the reinsureds were afforded the higher status of priority (c), then it is
possible that they could have recovered their reinsurance claims on a pro rata basis. Id.
10. Reserve Ins., 122 Ill. 2d at 558, 524 N.E.2d at 539. The supreme court allowed
the direct appeal pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 302(b). Id. (citing ILL. S. CT. R.
302(b), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1 10A, para. 302(b) (1987)).
11. Id. For the pertinent text of the Illinois liquidation statute, see supra note 9.
12. Reserve Ins., 122 Ill. 2d at 561-62, 524 N.E.2d at 540-41.
13. Id. at 561, 524 N.E.2d at 541.
14. Id. The court explained that the direct insurance policyholder is not a party to
the reinsurance agreement. Id.
15. Id. at 562, 524 N.E.2d at 541. Referring to section 4 of the Illinois Insurance
Code, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, para. 616 (1987), the court explained that insurance liabil-
ity, the risk assumed by reinsurers, is markedly different from the risks typically assumed
by direct insurers, such as fire, death, or accident. Reserve Ins., 122 11. 2d at 562, 524
N.E.2d at 541.
16. Reserve Ins., 122 Ill. 2d-at 563, 524 N.E.2d at 541-42 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
73, paras. 617, 671, 694, 711, 755.11, 756(4)(a), 767.9, 816.974(a), 1065.18-3, 1065.407
(1987)).
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ance."' 7 The court reasoned that these references demonstrate the
legislature's recognition of the distinction between the two terms
and its intention to use them independently.' 8  The court con-
cluded that if the legislature had intended to include reinsurance
claims in priority (c), then it would have mentioned specifically
reinsurance claims.19
Finally, after supporting its conclusion with case law from Illi-
nois and other jurisdictions, 20 the Reserve Insurance court consid-
ered an argument that the reinsureds advanced regarding the
Illinois Insurance Guaranty Fund21 and other state guaranty
funds.22 The reinsureds argued that construing section 205(l)(c) to
protect only direct insureds is unwarranted because state guaranty
fund statutes are designed to and do provide protection to direct
insureds against insurer insolvencies.23 Therefore, according to the
reinsureds, there is no policy justification for excluding reinsureds
from priority (c) under the guise of protecting direct insureds.24
The court rejected this argument, reasoning that some states do
not have guaranty funds and that the funds that do exist might not
17. Id. at 562, 524 N.E.2d at 541 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, paras. 719.02,
719.21 (1987)).
18. Id. at 563, 524 N.E.2d at 541.
19. Id. at 563, 524 N.E.2d at 542.
20. Id. at 564, 524 N.E.2d at 542. The court cited four Illinois cases to demonstrate
that its conclusion was consistent with well-established legal principles distinguishing re-
insurance from insurance. See People ex rel. Baylor v. Highway Ins. Co., 57 Ill. 2d 590,
316 N.E.2d 633 (1974); Union Cent. Life Ins. Co. v. Lowe, 349 Ill. 464, 182 N.E. 611
(1932); Baltica Ins. Co. v. Carr, 330 Ill. 608, 162 N.E. 178 (1928); Vial v. Norwich Union
Fire Ins. Soc'y, 257 Ill. 355, 100 N.E. 929 (1913). The court cited decisions from other
jurisdictions as persuasive authority. See Foremost Life Ins. Co. v. Department of Ins.,
409 N.E.2d 1092 (Ind. 1980); Neff v. Cherokee Ins. Co., 704 S.W.2d 1 (Tenn. 1986).
21. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, paras. 1065.82-1065.103 (1987).
22. Reserve Ins., 122 Ill. 2d at 569, 524 N.E.2d at 542. Concern over property and
casualty insurer insolvencies in the 1950s and 1960s led to the creation of guaranty funds
by state legislatures. These funds bear the responsibility of paying on behalf of insolvent
insurers' claims that are covered under the terms of the statute. Blaine, State Insurance
Guaranty Laws, 12 FORUM 808 (1977); Annotation, Insurer Insolvency Claims, 30 A.L.R.
4th 1110 (1984).
The activities of the Illinois Guaranty Fund are funded by companies authorized to
transact insurance business in Illinois. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, para. 1065.87-6 (1987).
Each company is assessed up to 1% of that company's net direct written premiums for
the preceding calendar year. Id.
23. Reserve Ins., 122 Ill. 2d at 565, 524 N.E.2d at 542. In Illinois, for example, an
insured may collect up to $150,000 per claim from the Illinois Guranty Fund if its insurer
is declared insolvent. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, para. 1065.87-2 (1987). Claims of insurers
are specifically excluded from coverage under this statute. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, para.
1065.84-3(b)(ii)(1987).
24. Reserve Ins., 122 I11. 2d at 565, 524 N.E.2d at 542.
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fully protect direct insureds.25 The Reserve Insurance court also
noted that the priorities established by section 205(l)(c) are rele-
vant not only in liquidations, but also in rehabilitation proceedings,
which do not even trigger the protection of the guaranty funds.2 6
As a matter of statutory interpretation, the decision in Reserve
Insurance raises many interesting questions. First, the court's con-
clusion that under the Insurance Code the meaning of the term
"insurance" does not extend to embrace reinsurance is somewhat
strained. The court's own distinction between reinsurance and "di-
rect insurance" 27 belies this conclusion. The term "direct insur-
ance" is not used in the liquidation statute or anywhere else in the
Insurance Code. Rather, the liquidation statute only refers to in-
surance contracts and policies.2 Significantly, reinsurance com-
monly has been referred to as a form of insurance by insurance
industry commentators29 and Illinois courts. 30 Moreover, the liq-
uidator in Reserve Insurance, the Illinois Director of Insurance,
regulates reinsurance under the Insurance Code.3'
Furthermore, although the Reserve Insurance court chose not to
address this issue, the Illinois Insurance Guaranty Fund statute32
contains a provision that expressly excludes reinsurance claims
from coverage. 33 The express exclusion casts considerable doubt
25. Id. at 566, 524 N.E.2d at 543. The court explained that some claims could exceed
caps imposed by guaranty funds and that coverage for certain types of claims might be
unavailable. Id.
26. Id. at 566-67, 524 N.E.2d at 543 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, para.
804(4)(1987)).
27. See supra notes 4-7, 12-15 and accompanying text.
28. See supra note 9.
29. For example, one commentator explained: "Reinsurance is a form of insurance.
As such, a contract of reinsurance is an insurance contract. It is so established in law,
and the general characteristics that distinguish a contract of insurance from other con-
tracts are required and found in contracts of reinsurance." Kramer, The Nature of Rein-
surance, in REINSURANCE 4 (R.W. Strain ed. 1980).
30. See, e.g., Pioneer Life Ins. Co. v. Alliance Life Ins. Co., 374 I11. 576, 587, 30
N.E.2d 66, 72 (1940) ("reinsurance policies ... are contracts of insurance"); American
Mut. Reinsurance Co. v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 52 Ill. App. 3d 922, 923, 928, 367 N.E.2d
104, 106, 109-10 (1st Dist. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 906 (1978) (referring to a reinsur-
ance agreement as a "contract of insurance" and reinsurance is "insurance" for purposes
of establishing exemption from regulation as provided under the McCarran-Ferguson In-
surance Regulation Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1982)); People v. Cosmopolitan Ins.
Co., 89 Ill. App. 2d 225, 229, 233 N.E.2d 90, 93 (lst Dist. 1967) ("[b]y this [reinsurance]
contract an insurance company purchased insurance").
31. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, paras. 636, 617, 748 (1987); ILL. ADMIN. CODE
tit. 50, § 923 (1985).
32. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, paras. 1065.82-1065.103 (1987).
33. The statute provides:
(b) "Covered Claim" does not include
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on the supreme court's conclusion that in the liquidation statute
the legislature would have expressly included reinsurance claims in
priority (c) if it had intended to afford them that status.34 Instead,
given the absence of an exclusion for reinsurance claims, it seems
more plausible to conclude that the legislature intended to include
reinsurance claims within priority (c).
Overall, it is unclear what impact the Reserve Insurance decision
will have on the insurance industry. Obviously, reinsureds now
face greater risk that some claims will not be satisfied. The losses
incurred by insurance companies when their reinsurance claims are
not paid due to reinsurer insolvencies may make direct insurance
more costly. Moreover, if insurance companies are less able to col-
lect reinsurance claims, then the potential that those insurers will
become financially impaired increases.35 The Illinois Legislature
should better integrate the current statutory scheme for protecting
claimants of insolvent insurers because there is no end in sight to
the significant problem of insurer insolvencies.36
III. THE INSURER'S DUTY TO DEFEND AND INDEMNIFY
A. The Pollution Exclusion
For many years, commercial insurers and their policyholders de-
bated the scope of the pollution exclusion3 7 of the comprehensive
v) any claim for any amount due any reinsurer, insurer, insurance pool or
underwriting association as subrogated recoveries or otherwise.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, para. 1065.84-3(b)(v)(1987).
The difference in the legislature's treatment of the Illinois Insurance Guaranty Fund
statute and the liquidation statute is important because of the similar purpose for which
each was obviously passed - protecting claimants from insolvent insurers. The Guar-
anty Fund was created in 1971, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 73, para. 1065.82 (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1987), four years prior to the passage of the current version of the liquidation
statute. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 73, para. 817 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1988).
34. See supra notes 16-19 and accompanying text.
35. See Security Mut. Casualty Co. v. Century Casualty Co., 531 F.2d 974, 978 (10th
Cir. 1976)(by not being able to collect its reinsurance claims, "[a]n apparently solvent
insurer might be plunged into insolvency").
36. See Law and Practice of Insurance Company Insolvency (A.B.A. Nat'l Inst.
1986).
37. The pollution exclusion first appeared in 1970 as an endorsement to the compre-
hensive general liability ("CGL") policy, but soon thereafter became part of the actual
CGL form. Hendrick & Wiezel, The New Commercial General Liability Forms - An
Introduction and Critique, 36 FED'N INS. & CORP. COUNS. 317, 344 (1986)[hereinafter
Hendrick & Wiezel]. The pollution exclusion removes from coverage:
[B]odily injury or property damage arising out of the discharge, dispersal, re-
lease, or escape of smoke, vapors, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, toxic chemicals,
liquids or gases, or waste materials or other irritants, contaminants or pollu-
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general liability ("CGL") policy.38 This debate has often focused
on what meaning to ascribe to the "sudden and accidental" excep-
tion to the pollution exclusion.39 In International Minerals and
Chemical Co. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance,4° the Illinois Appellate
Court for the First District considered this issue and found that the
pollution exclusion precluded coverage for the defense and indem-
nification costs relating to an environmental clean-up action
brought against an insured.4" In International Minerals, the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency ("EPA") brought suit in New
Hampshire against International Minerals and Chemical Company
("IMC") under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of
1976 ("RCRA")42 and the Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 ("CERCLA" or
"Superfund").4 3 The EPA alleged that the operation by IMC of a
barrel reconditioning facility in New Hampshire caused environ-
mental contamination." In connection with the EPA suit, IMC
filed a separate declaratory judgment action against its insurers in
the Circuit Court of Cook County.4 5 IMC sought a declaration
that its liability insurers owed a duty to IMC to defend and indem-
nify the company in connection with the the EPA action. 46 IMC's
various insurers denied having any such duty, raising the pollution
tants into or upon land, the atmosphere or any water course or body of water;
but this exclusion does not apply if such discharge, dispersal, release or escape is
sudden and accidental.
International Minerals & Chem. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins., 168 I11. App. 3d 361, 369, 522
N.E.2d 758, 763 (1st Dist. 1988).
38. In an effort to further restrict pollution coverage, the pollution exclusion recently
has been changed to delete the "sudden and accidental" exception to the exclusion. See
Hendrick & Wiezel, supra note 37, at 343-50.
39. See infra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
40. 168 Ill. App. 3d 361, 522 N.E.2d 758 (1st Dist. 1988).
41. Id. at 379-80, 522 N.E.2d at 770.
42. Id. at 365, 522 N.E.2d at 761 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1982)).
43. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1982).
44. Specifically, the court summarized the EPA allegations as follows:
IMC operated a barrel reconditioning business on the GLCC site; that on the
site was a storage area where up to 60,000 barrels were stored pending recondi-
tioning; that in the course of the reconditioning process the barrels were emp-
tied of all chemical wastes and residues and then washed, rinsed, and stripped
of rust by various industrial processes, including the use of caustic solutions;
that the wastes from the drums were deposited and discharged onto the ground
at the site; that those wastes contaminated the soil, migrated to, entered and
contaminated the groundwater, the flow of which carried contaminants into the
ground and surface waters used by local residents.
International Minerals, 168 I11. App. 3d at 376, 522 N.E.2d at 768.
45. Id. at 365-66, 522 N.E.2d at 761.
46. Id. at 366, 522 N.E.2d at 761.
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exclusion as an affirmative defense. 7 In affirming the trial court's
decision, the appellate court held that the pollution exclusion
clearly and unambiguously removed from coverage the very type
of liability alleged in the EPA complaint.48
The International Minerals court first determined that the alle-
gations in the EPA complaint49 brought IMC's claims at least "po-
tentially" within the scope of the coverage grant5° of the CGL
policy.5" The court had little difficulty, however, finding that the
EPA's allegations triggered the application of the pollution exclu-
sion because there was a polluting event as well as pollution
damage.52
47. Id.
48. Id. at 375, 522 N.E.2d at 767.
49. See supra note 44.
50. The coverage grant of the CGL policy provides coverage for an "occurrence,"
defined as "an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to conditions, which
results in bodily injury or property damage neither expected nor intended from the stand-
point of the insured." International Minerals, 168 Ill. App. 3d at 361, 522 N.E.2d at 763.
The International Minerals court determined that the relevant inquiry in applying this
definition is whether the insured intended or expected the damage resulting from the
polluting event. Id. at 371-72, 522 N.E.2d at 765. In this context, the International
Minerals court held that the EPA suit against IMC potentially was covered by an "occur-
rence" as defined under the CGL policy. Id. at 375, 522 N.E.2d at 767. But see Great
Lakes Container Corp. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 727 F.2d 30 (1st Cir. 1984)(find-
ing no occurrence under the CGL policy in precisely the same context as the Interna-
tional Minerals case).
Notably, the International Minerals court did not address the issue of whether govern-
ment-mandated clean-up costs are recoverable as "property damage." Other courts have
addressed this issue, and there is a split of authority. See, e.g., Continental Ins. Co. v.
Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 842 F.2d 977 (8th Cir. 1988)(en banc)(clean-
up costs are not recoverable as property damage); Maryland Casualty Co. v. Armco, Inc.,
643 F. Supp. 430 (D. Md. 1986), aff'd, 822 F.2d 1348 (4th Cir. 1987)(EPA claim for
response costs does not constitute a claim for damages); Verlan, Ltd. v. John L. Armitage
& Co., 695 F. Supp. 950 (N.D. Ill. 1988)(clean-up costs do not constitute property dam-
age); But see Intel Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 662 F. Supp. 1507 (N.D.
Cal. 1987)(government-mandated clean-up expenses are fully compensable); United
States Fidelity & Guar. v. Thomas Solvent Co., 683 F. Supp. 1139 (W.D. Mich.
1988)(clean-up costs are recoverable as property damage). For a general discussion of
other decisions considering the issue of whether environmental clean-up costs constitute
"property damage," see Pope & Bates, Significant Insurance Coverage Issues of the
1980's, 53 INS. COUNS. J. 276, 291-92 (1986)[hereinafter Pope & Bates].
51. International Minerals, 168 Ill. App. 3d at 375, 522 N.E.2d at 767. In assessing
whether an insurer has a duty to defend, Illinois courts first will compare the allegations
in the complaint to the insurance policy provisions and determine whether the allegations
potentially bring the claims within the scope of coverage. Zurich Ins. Co. v. Raymark
Indus. Inc., 118 Ill. 2d 23, 514 N.E.2d 150 (1987).
52. International Minerals, 168 Ill. App. 3d at 375, 522 N.E.2d at 767. The court
reasoned that an insurer must satisfy only two elements to trigger the exclusion. First,
the underlying complaint must allege a polluting activity or event. Id. Second, the un-
derlying complaint must allege environmental damage. Both allegations were at the
heart of the EPA complaint. Id. at 375-76, 522 N.E.2d at 767.
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After finding that the pollution exclusion applied to IMC's
claim, the court considered whether the matters asserted in the
EPA complaint fell within the "sudden and accidental" exception
to the pollution exclusion. The court initially analyzed the plain
language of the exclusion 3 and determined that the exception re-
lates to pollution activity, not pollution damage.54 Consistent with
this observation, the court focused on IMC's alleged activities and
noted the considerable magnitude and ongoing nature of IMC's
barrel reconditioning business.55 The International Minerals court
reasoned that although the systematic discharge or release of pollu-
tants alleged in the EPA complaint arguably could be character-
ized as "accidental,"56 it could not properly be described as
"sudden."5 The court explained that the term sudden, as com-
monly understood, has temporal significance, describing events oc-
curring "with very brief notice," "abruptly," or "hastily." 58 The
court concluded that IMC's alleged pollution activity did not fall
within this common understanding of "sudden."59
Unlike other decisions that have improperly strained to find am-
biguity in the "sudden and accidental" language of the pollution
exclusion," the International Minerals decision presents a well-rea-
53. Id. at 376, 522 N.E.2d at 767-68. The exception to the pollution exclusion pro-
vides that the exclusion "does not apply if such discharge, dispersal, release or escape is
sudden and accidental." Id.
54. Id. at 375, 522 N.E.2d at 767.
55. IMC operated the reconditioning facilities from May 1973 to August 1976. Id. at
365, 522 N.E.2d at 761.
56. Id. at 377, 522 N.E.2d at 768. The court was reluctant to concede that the dis-
charge was accidental. Id. The court found it "highly unlikely" that IMC would not
have expected a discharge, given the nature of its barrel reconditioning process. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 378, 522 N.E.2d at 769 (citing WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY 2284 (1986)).
59. Id.
60. Under the coverage grant of the CGL policy, coverage is provided for an "occur-
rence." An occurrence is defined as "an accident, including continuous or repeated expo-
sure to conditions, which results in bodily injury or property damage neither expected
nor intended from the standpoint of the insured." Id. at 361, 522 N.E.2d at 763. Some
courts view the "sudden and accidental" exception to the pollution exclusion as a mere
restatement of the fact that coverage is provided for "unexpected or unintended" damage.
See, e.g., Peppers Steel & Alloys, Inc. v. United States Fidelity & Guar., 668 F. Supp.
1541, 1549 (S.D. Fla. 1987)("if a spill or release of chemical substances ... is neither
expected nor intended . . . it follows that it was 'sudden and accidental' "); Payne v.
United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 625 F. Supp. 1189 (S.D. Fla. 1985)(because the com-
plaint was devoid of any allegations suggesting that the release of PCBs was intended or
expected, the release was sudden and accidental); Travelers Indem. Co. v. Dingwell, 414
A.2d 220, 225 (Me. 1980)("[i]t is possible that the release could have been unexpected
and unintended, and thus outside of [the sudden and accidental] exclusion"); Jackson
Township Mun. Utils. Auth. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 186 N.J. Super. 156,
1989] 489
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soned and straightforward interpretation of that language. In
reaching its decision, the court departed from its earlier position6'
and joined those courts that construe each word in the "sudden
and accidental" exception to have independent meaning.62
Illinois courts adopting the International Minerals analysis will
find that coverage for pollution-related damage exists only where
the activity causing pollution damage occurred abruptly, hastily,
or with little notice. Thus, in situations where pollution damage is
caused by continuous activity over a period of time, courts will find
that liability coverage will not apply. This result will properly
place the burden of controlling pollution damage on insureds who
are in the best position to regulate and control their pollution-re-
lated activities.63
164, 451 A.2d 990, 994 (1982)(the pollution exclusion can be interpreted as simply a
restatement of the definition of occurrence); Buckeye Union Ins. Co. v. Liberty Solvents
& Chems. Co., 17 Ohio App. 3d 127, 477 N.E.2d 1227 (1984)(release of hazardous waste
was sudden and accidental because there were no allegations that it was intended or
expected); United Pacific Ins. Co. v. Van's Westlake Union, Inc., 34 Wash. App. 708,
714, 664 P.2d 1262, 1266 (1983) (quoting Jackson Township, 186 N.J. Super. at 164, 451
A.2d at 994) (the pollution exclusion "clause can be interpreted as simply a restatement
of the definition of 'occurrence' ").
For summaries and analyses of many of these cases and of cases taking similar ap-
proaches, see Pope & Bates, supra note 50, at 292-99.
61. See Reliance Ins. Co. v. Martin, 126 Ill. App. 3d 94, 467 N.E.2d 287 (1st Dist.
1984) (citing courts holding that the terms "sudden" and "accidental" have the same
meaning). The International Minerals court expressly disavowed its earlier approval of
those cases. International Minerals, 168 Ill. App. 3d at 379, 522 N.E.2d at 770.
62. International Minerals, 168 Ill. App. 3d at 379, 522 N.E.2d at 770. See, e.g.,
Claussen v. Aetna Casualty & Sur., 676 F. Supp. 1571, 1580 (S.D. Ga. 1987)("[o]nly in
the minds of hypercreative lawyers could the word 'sudden' be stripped of its essential
temporal attributes"); Fischer & Porter Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 656 F. Supp. 132,
140 (E.D. Pa. 1986) ("[c]ontamination that results from continuous dumping of toxic
chemicals ... is not sudden, even if one could argue that the spillage was accidental or
the resulting damage unexpected"); Waste Management of Carolinas, Inc. v. Peerless Ins.
Co., 315 N.C. 688, 340 S.E.2d 374 (1986)(although the leaching of contaminants into
groundwater over a number of years arguably might be characterized as accidental, it
cannot properly be called sudden); Techalloy Co. v. Reliance Ins. Co., 338 Pa. Super. 1,
487 A.2d 820 (1984)(while the discharge at issue might have been accidental, it was not
sudden).
For summaries and analyses of many of these cases and others, see Pope & Bates, supra
note 50, at 292-99.
63. This policy concern was articulated in Waste Management of Carolinas, Inc. v.
Peerless Ins. Co., 315 N.C. 688, 340 S.E.2d 374 (1986). In explaining the policy reasons
behind the pollution exclusion, the Waste Management court stated that "if an insured
knows that liability incurred by all manner of negligent or careless spills and releases is
covered by his liability policy, he is tempted to diminish his precautions and relax his
vigilance." Id. at 693, 340 S.E.2d at 381.
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B. The Repair and Replacement of Defective Component
Products Manufactured by the Insured
Although the CGL policy covers "property damage" caused to a
third party, a standard exclusion in the policy removes from cover-
age "property damage to the named insured's products arising out
of such products" (the "product exclusion")."4 The exclusion was
drafted to prevent recovery for damage to an insured's products
caused by the insured's own mistakes.65 In Marathon Plastics v.
International Insurance Co.,66 the Illinois Appellate Court for the
Fourth District held that the product exclusion did not preclude
coverage for the cost of repairing and replacing a defective product
that the court determined had caused damage to a third party's
property.67
In Marathon Plastics, the plaintiff, Marathon Plastics Company
("Marathon"), sold polyvinylchloride ("PVC") pipe that it had
manufactured to Albrecht Well Drilling ("Albrecht"). 6 Albrecht
installed the PVC piping in an underground water system. 69 The
piping had defective seals that caused the installed system to leak.7 °
As a result, Albrecht had to make repairs. 71 Albrecht sought re-
covery from Marathon for the costs expended in making the re-
pairs.72 Marathon settled with Albrecht and then brought suit
against its insurer, International Insurance Company ("Interna-
tional"), which had denied liability coverage for Albrecht's claim.73
The trial court held that International's policy afforded indemnity
coverage for Albrecht's claim.74
64. Hamilton & Morse, The Comprehensive General Liability Policy, LIABILITY IN-
SURANCE § 3.25 (IICLE 1989).
65. Hamilton & Marick, Comprehensive General Liability Professional & Excess Cov-
erage, ATTORNEY'S GUIDE TO LIABILITY INSURANCE § 3.30 (IICLE 1985). The exclu-
sion limits the scope of products liability coverage and is intended to prevent an insurer
from becoming the guarantor of the quality of the insured's products. Id. Other types of
insurance coverage is available to specifically cover product performance. Hamilton &
Marick, Comprehensive General Liability Professional & Excess Coverage, ATTORNEY'S
GUIDE TO LIABILITY INSURANCE § 3.28 (IICLE 1985).
66. 161 Ill. App. 3d 452, 514 N.E.2d 479 (4th Dist. 1987).
67. Id. at 465, 514 N.E.2d at 487.
68. Id. at 456, 514 N.E.2d at 481.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 457, 514 N.E.2d at 481. Marathon argued, and both the trial and appellate
courts agreed, that International had actually authorized the settlement with Albrecht.
Id.
74. Id. at 458, 514 N.E.2d at 482.
1989]
Loyola University Law Journal
On appeal,75 International argued that Marathon's alleged dam-
ages consisted entirely of defects in its own product, the PVC pipe,
and thus fell within the product exclusion."6 Marathon asserted
that it did not seek recovery for the cost of its defective products,
but instead for damages caused to Albrecht, a third party." In
affirming the trial court's decision in favor of the insured, the ap-
pellate court relied primarily on Pittway Corp. v. American Motor-
ists Insurance Co.78 and Elco Industries, Inc. v. Liberty Mutual
Insurance.79 According to the Marathon Plastics court, these deci-
sions held that the term "property damage," as used in the CGL
policy, encompasses more than just physical harm or injury to
property."0 The term also includes property that was diminished in
value or made useless.81 Accordingly, the Marathon Plastics court
determined that the defective PVC pipe had rendered Albrecht's
entire water system useless and had diminished its value. 82 There-
fore, the court concluded that Marathon had caused property dam-
age to a third party and held that Marathon's claim was not
excluded from coverage.8 3
The Marathon Plastics decision expands considerably the scope
of liability coverage for problems caused by the insured's own
products. Although the court placed emphasis on the Pittway and
Elco decisions, both cases, unlike Marathon Plastics, involved ac-
tual physical damage to the property of a third party caused by the
insured's products.8 4 The Marathon Plastics court, while conced-
75. In addition to the central issue in this appeal concerning the product exclusion,
International raised several other issues, all of which were resolved in Marathon's favor.
Most significantly, the court concluded that International was estopped from raising cer-
tain policy defenses because of evidence establishing that International had actually au-
thorized the settlement agreement. Id. at 459, 514 N.E.2d at 483.
76. Id. at 461, 514 N.E.2d at 484.
77. Id.
78. Id. (citing Pittway Corp. v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 56 Ill. App. 3d 338, 370
N.E.2d 1271 (2d Dist. 1977)). In Pittway, the insured manufactured defective aerosol
valves that rendered a third party's aerosol cans completely inoperable. Pittway, 56 Ill.
App. 3d at 340, 370 N.E.2d at 1272-73.
79. Marathon, 161 Ill. App. 3d at 462, 514 N.E.2d at 485 (citing Elco Indus., Inc. v.
Liberty Mut. Ins., 90 Ill. App. 3d 1106, 414 N.E.2d 41 (1st Dist. 1980)). In Elco, the
insured supplied defective regulating pins to an engine manufacturer. Elco, 90 Ill. App.
3d at 1108, 414 N.E.2d at 43. The repair and replacement of the the defective pins ruined
gaskets and plugs contained in the engines. Id. at 1 110, 414 N.E.2d at 46.
80. Marathon, 161 Ill. App. 3d at 461-63, 514 N.E.2d at 484-85.
81. Id. at 462, 514 N.E.2d at 485.
82. Id. at 463, 514 N.E.2d at 485.
83. Id. at 465, 514 N.E.2d at 487. The cost of the actual replacement pipe, Mara-
thon's own product, was neither sought nor allowed as damages. Marathon only recov-
ered labor and related costs. Id. at 463, 514 N.E.2d at 486.
84. See supra notes 78 and 79.
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ing that "no physical damage occurred to the water system,"8 5
nonetheless found that coverage existed for the settlement with Al-
brecht. 6 The court based its decision solely on the premise that
the water system had suffered a "diminution in value."'8 7 This con-
clusion cannot be reconciled with either the CGL policy's property
damage definition requiring "physical injury to or destruction of
tangible property"88 or with prior Illinois case law.8 9 The court's
decision in effect transforms a liability policy into a guaranty of
product quality.
IV. UNDERINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE
Underinsured motorist ("UIM") coverage is first-party cover-
age9° available to an injured insured when a tortfeasor carries some
liability protection, but not enough to fully compensate the insured
for his injuries. 91 Between September 3, 1980, and July 1, 1983, no
automobile liability insurance policy could be issued or renewed in
Illinois unless a proper "offer" 92 of UIM coverage had been made
85. Marathon, 161 Ill. App. 3d at 463, 514 N.E.2d at 485.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 461, 514 N.E.2d at 484.
89. For example, in Quails v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., 123 Ill. App. 3d 831, 462
N.E.2d 1288 (4th Dist. 1984), the court held that a carpenter's poor workmanship that
resulted in the diminished value of a home was not covered property damage. The court
found that diminution in value is the inevitable result of defective workmanship and is
not covered. Id. at 835, 462 N.E.2d at 1292. See also Dreis & Krump Mfg. Co. v.
Phoenix Ins. Co., 548 F.2d 681 (7th Cir. 1977); Hamilton Die Cast v. United States
Fidelity & Guar. Co., 508 F.2d 417 (7th Cir. 1975); CMO Graphics v. CNA Ins., 115 Ill.
App. 3d 491, 450 N.E.2d 860 (1st Dist. 1983).
90. First-party insurance is defined as "insurance which applies to the insured's own
property or person." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 722 (5th ed. 1979).
91. Currently, under Illinois law, UIM insurance provides coverage against an "un-
derinsured motor vehicle." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, para. 755a-2(3)(1987). An "underin-
sured motor vehicle" is defined as "a motor vehicle whose ownership, maintenance or use
has resulted in bodily injury or death of the insured . . .and for which the sum of the
limits of liability under all bodily injury liability insurance policies ... is less than the
limits for underinsured coverage provided the insured." Id.
92. Significant litigation has resulted over insurers' attempts to comply with the stat-
utory requirement that uninsured motorist ("UM") or UIM coverage be "offered" to the
insured. The Illinois Supreme Court set forth the criteria for satisfying the required "of-
fer" of coverage in Cloninger v. National Gen. Ins. Co., 109 Ill. 2d 419, 488 N.E.2d 548
(1985). The Cloninger court adopted a four-part test to aid in determining whether an
"offer" of UIM coverage was properly made:
(1) notification must be commercially reasonable if the offer is made in other
than face-to-face negotiations; (2) the limits of the optional coverage must be
specified and not set forth in general terms; (3) the insured must be intelligibly
advised by the insurer of the nature of the option; and (4) the insurer must
advise the insured that the optional coverage is available for relatively modest
premium increases.
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to the insured.93 In Fuoss v. Auto Owners (Mutual) Insurance
Co.,9" the Illinois Supreme Court resolved a conflict at the appel-
late court level95 over the proper remedy to afford an insured for
the insurer's failure to make a proper offer of UIM coverage.
In Fuoss, Edward K. Fuoss, the plaintiff, sustained injuries in a
car accident for which he was not at fault.96 Fuoss had an auto
policy with Auto Owners (Mutual) Insurance Company ("Auto
Owners"). The policy provided bodily injury ("BI") liability limits
of $25,000 per person and $50,000 per occurrence (i.e., coverage of
$25,000/$50,000) and UM limits of $15,000/$30,000. 97 The policy
provided no UIM coverage. 98 Fuoss settled his claim against the
tortfeasor for $100,000, the maximum amount recoverable under
the tortfeasor's policy. 99 Because Fuoss's damages apparently ex-
ceeded that amount, he maintained a declaratory judgment action
against Auto Owners in an attempt to recover first-party benefits
under his own policy.100 Fuoss charged that Auto Owners' failure
to present him with an offer for UIM coverage as required under
Illinois law' °" caused his coverage gap.102 Fuoss argued that the
insurance policy should be reformed to include UIM coverage in
Id. at 425-26, 488 N.E.2d at 550. See also Petersen v. Allstate Ins. Co., 171 I11. App. 3d
909, 525 N.E.2d 1094 (1st Dist. 1988).
93. An "offer" was required after September 3, 1980, pursuant to ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 73, para. 755a-2(3) (Supp. 1980)(amended 1982). Effective July 1, 1983, the Insur-
ance Code requires that UIM coverage be included in automobile liability policies in an
amount equal to the UM coverage purchased by the insured. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73,
para. 755a-2(5)(1987).
94. 118 Ill. 2d 430, 516 N.E.2d 268 (1987).
95. In Tucker v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., 125 Ill. App. 3d 329, 465 N.E.2d 956 (4th
Dist. 1984), the appellate court suggested in dicta that the proper remedy for an insurer's
failure to offer UIM coverage was to imply coverage equal to the insured party's UM
coverage. Id. at 328, 465 N.E.2d at 936. In contrast, in Logsdon v. Shelter Mut. Ins.
Co., 143 Ill. App. 3d 957, 493 N.E.2d 748 (3d Dist. 1986), the court held that in the
absence of a proper offer of UIM coverage, coverage should be implied after a loss in an
amount equal to the maximum amount of bodily injury coverage offered by the insurer
for the last renewal period prior to the injury. Id. at 964, 493 N.E.2d at 753.
Notably, the appellate court in Fuoss v. Auto Owners (Mutual) Ins. Co., 148 Ill. App.
3d 526, 499 N.E.2d 539 (5th Dist. 1986), while purporting to follow Tucker, held that
UIM coverage is to be implied in an amount equal to the injured insured's bodily injury
liability coverage. Id. at 535, 499 N.E.2d at 545.
96. Fuoss, 118 Ill. 2d at 432, 516 N.E.2d at 269.
97. Id. at 431-32, 516 N.E.2d at 265.
98. Id. at 432, 516 N.E.2d at 265.
99. Id. at 432, 516 N.E.2d at 269.
100. Id.
101. Id. Fuoss invoked ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, para. 755a-(2)(1987).
102. Fuoss, 118 Ill. 2d at 432, 516 N.E.2d at 269.
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an amount sufficient to fully cover his loss.1"3 Auto Owners as-
serted that Fuoss was not entitled to any further recovery. Auto
Owners argued that the $100,000 Fuoss already had received ex-
ceeded any amount that he would be entitled to under the Illinois
Insurance Code.' °0
The supreme court affirmed the appellate court and rejected
Fuoss's argument.'05 The court noted that an insured could not
purchase UIM coverage in an amount exceeding the insured's UM
limit.10 6 Additionally, the court noted that UM coverage could not
exceed the insured's BI coverage. 0 7 Thus, the court reasoned, the
most UIM coverage that could be imputed as part of Fuoss' insur-
ance policy was $25,000, the amount of BI coverage that he had
purchased.'0 This amount was less than the $100,000 Fuoss al-
ready had received from the tortfeasor's insurer. 0 9 Therefore, the
court concluded that he was not entitled to further recovery.110
Since 1983, Illinois law has required automobile liability policies
to include UIM coverage in an amount equal to the insured's UM
limits. Therefore, there are presumably few cases remaining upon
which Fuoss will have a direct impact."' Nevertheless, on a
103. Id. In making this argument, Fuoss partly relied on Logsdon v. Shelter Mut.
Ins. Co., 143 Ill. App. 3d 957, 493 N.E.2d 748 (1986), discussed supra note 95.
104. Fuoss, 118 Ill. 2d at 434-35, 516 N.E.2d 270-71. The Insurance Code provides
that "[t]he limits of liability for an insurer providing underinsured motorist coverage
shall be the limits of such coverage, less those amounts actually recovered under the
applicable bodily injury insurance . on the underinsured motor vehicle." ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 73, para. 755a-2(3)(1987).
At the appellate level, Auto Owners urged the court to follow Tucker v. Country Mut.
Ins. Co., 125 Ill. App. 3d 329, 465 N.E.2d 956 (3d Dist. 1984), and impute UIM coverage
in an amount equal to Fuoss' UM coverage ($15,000/$30,000). Fuoss v. Auto Owners
(Mutual) Ins. Co., 148 Ill. App. 3d 526, 530, 499 N.E.2d 539, 542 (5th Dist. 1986). It is
not clear whether this argument was presented to the supreme court.
105. Fuoss, 118 Ill. 2d at 435, 516 N.E.2d at 271.
106. Id. at 435, 516 N.E.2d at 270. The Insurance Code states that "the named in-
sured may elect to purchase limits of underinsured motorist coverage in an amount up to
the uninsured motorist coverage on the insured vehicle." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, para.
755a-2(4)(1987).
107. Fuoss, 118 Ill. 2d at 435, 516 N.E.2d at 270. The Insurance Code further pro-
vides that uninsured motorist coverage must be "offered in an amount up to the insured's
bodily injury liability limits." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, para. 755a-2(l) (1987).
108. Fuoss, 118 Ill. 2d at 434, 516 N.E.2d at 270.
109. Id. at 432, 516 N.E.2d at 269.
110. Id. at 434, 516 N.E.2d at 270. The court based its conclusion on ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 73, para. 755a-2 (1987). See supra note 104.
111. Notably, the precise issue addressed in Fuoss arose again in Overbey v. Illinois
Farmers Ins. Co., 170 I11. App. 3d 594, 525 N.E.2d 1076 (2d Dist. 1988). Following the
Fuoss decision, the Overbey court denied the insured's request to imply UIM coverage in
an amount equal to the maximum bodily injury liability limits offered by the insurer. Id.
at 604, 525 N.E.2d at 1083.
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broader level, the Fuoss decision demonstrates the Illinois Supreme
Court's unwillingness to recognize a speculative remedy for an in-
surer's violation of the Insurance Code.
V. LIFE INSURANCE: PREMIUM DUE NOTICE REQUIREMENTS
Generally, a life insurance company must comply with statu-
tory premium due notice requirements before it may enforce a dec-
laration of forfeiture. 112 In Illinois, section 234 of the Insurance
Code governs notice of premium due requirements." 13 In First Na-
tional Bank v. Mutual Trust,14 the Illinois Supreme Court deter-
mined that the notice requirements under section 234(1) are not
applicable when an insured defaults on premium payments due on
a life insurance policy beyond the time allowed by the statute." 5
In First National Bank, First National Bank ("Bank") was as-
signed a $100,000 life insurance policy issued by the Mutual Trust
Life Insurance Company ("Mutual") as collateral for a loan." 6
Mutual received and acknowledged the assignment. 1 7 Following
the death of the insured, the Bank filed a claim under the policy,
but it learned that Mutual had declared a forfeiture of the policy
approximately twenty months earlier." 8 Mutual had declared the
forfeiture because the insured failed to make a premium pay-
ment." 9 The Bank filed suit against Mutual for the life insurance
proceeds, arguing that Mutual violated the notice provisions in sec-
tion 234(1).12 ° The Bank contended that Mutual's action was void
because Mutual had failed to send it the required advance
notice.' 2 '
112. 2A G. COUCH, R. ANDERSON, & M. RHODES, COUCH ON INSURANCE
§ 30:124 (2d ed. rev. 1984).
113. Section 234 provides in pertinent part:
No life company ... shall declare any policy forfeited or lapsed within six
months after default in payment... unless a written notice.., of such premium
... shall have been [sent] to the person whose life is insured, or the assignee of
the policy... at least fifteen days and not more than forty-five days prior to the
day when the same is due and payable ....
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, para. 846 (1987).
114. 122 I11. 2d 116, 522 N.E.2d 70 (1988).
115. Id. at 122, 522 N.E.2d at 72. Generally, the period will be six months. See
supra note 113. However, the statute allows for an extension of that time if the policy
contains a nonforfeiture provision. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, para. 846(1) (1987).
116. First Nat'l Bank, 122 Ill. 2d at 118, 522 N.E.2d at 70.
117. Id. at 118, 522 N.E.2d at 71.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 116, 522 N.E.2d at 71. See supra note 113 for the pertinent text of section
234.
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Although the supreme court agreed that Mutual had not com-
plied with the notice requirement of section 234(1), it nonetheless
held in favor of the insurer.'22 The court noted that section 234(1)
is only concerned with insurance policies that are in default for less
than the six-month period specified in the statute. 1 23 Accordingly,
the court determined that the premium due notice requirements of
section 234(1) are applicable only when an insurer seeks to effect a
forfeiture within the statutory period.' 24 Noting that the policy at
issue remained in default well beyond the statutory period, 25 the
supreme court concluded that the notice requirements did not ap-
ply and, therefore, that the policy was subject to forfeiture. 26 The
First National Bank decision appropriately gives full effect to the
plain terms of section 234(1).
VI. MANDATORY AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY INSURANCE
During the Survey year, the Illinois General Assembly approved
legislation requiring Illinois motorists to carry minimum limits of
liability insurance. 27  Governor James Thompson signed House
Bill 3900 into law on August 25, 1988,128 but enforcement will not
begin until January 1, 1990.129
The new law will make it illegal to operate, register, or maintain
registration of an automobile without first obtaining liability insur-
ance coverage. 30 Enforcement is anticipated at two different
levels. First, if a motorist fails to carry motor vehicle insurance,
the law authorizes police officers to ticket motorists for four newly
122. First Nat'I Bank, 122 Il. 2d at 122, 522 N.E.2d at 72.
123. Id. The period may be longer if the policy contains a nonforfeiture provision.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, para. 846(1) (1987).
124. First Nat'l Bank, 122 Ill. 2d at 122, 522 N.E.2d at 72.
125. The insured failed to make a premium payment that was due on May 1, 1983,
but a nonforfeiture provision extended coverage through September 16, 1983. Id. at 120,
522 N.E.2d at 71-72. It is not clear which date started the statutory period running, but
the point is moot because the Bank's suit was filed over two years after the latter of the
two dates. Id. at 117, 522 N.E.2d at 70.
126. Id. at 122, 522 N.E.2d at 72.
127. 1988 Ill. Legis. Serv. 85-1201 (West)(to be codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
95 1/2, para. 7-601).
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. The law requires insurance "in amounts no less than the minimum amounts
set for bodily injury or death and for destruction of property under Section 7-203 of [the
Illinois Vehicle] Code." Id. Section 7-203, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95 1/2, para. 7-203
(1987), requires minimum bodily injury limits of $20,000 per person, $40,000 per occur-
rence, and minimum property damage limits of $15,000.
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instituted traffic offenses.' 3 ' Each offense imposes a substantial fine
plus the suspension of the registration of the vehicle involved.'32
Second, the law authorizes the Secretary of State to verify compli-
ance with insurance requirements through random checks and in-
quiries. 133 Noncompliance will result in the suspension of vehicle
registration. 34
It is unclear what effect the new Illinois mandatory insurance
law will have on reducing the number of uninsured vehicles in Illi-
nois. Differing opinions on this issue prevented the passage of sim-
ilar proposals in the Illinois General Assembly for nearly two
decades.' 35 Opponents of the new law pointed to the experiences of
other states with similar laws, arguing that mandatory insurance
would result in an increase in insurance premiums without produc-
ing any measurable benefit.1 36 Supporters countered that the ex-
periences in other states have been mixed, and that the Illinois
Legislature drafted the Act guided by these experiences. 137
Whatever the predictive value of the experiences of other states,
Illinois' own experience over the next four years will ultimately
determine the fate of mandatory insurance in Illinois. The Illinois
mandatory insurance law contains a sunset clause that extends its
application only through December 31, 1993.138 Any further ex-
131. 1988 Ill. Legis. Serv. 85-1201 (West) (to be codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
95 1/2, para. 7-601).
132. Id. The four new traffic offenses include: (1) operating a motor vehicle not cov-
ered by insurance; (2) operating a motor vehicle when the registration of that vehicle has
been suspended for noninsurance; (3) refusing to display a proper insurance card; and
(4) displaying false evidence of insurance. The minimum fine is $500 for conviction of
either (1) or (3), and $1000 for conviction of (2). Conviction of (4) is a class A misde-
meanor. The minimum suspension for conviction of any one of these offenses is two
months. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Prior to passage of the current law, mandatory automobile insurance proposals
had been introduced and debated in the Illinois General Assembly for 17 consecutive
years with little success. The only such bill to pass both houses of the Illinois General
Assembly was vetoed by Governor Dan Walker in 1975.
136. This conclusion rests upon the notion that mandatory insurance forces many
more high-risk drivers to purchase insurance. The high cost of claims, it is argued, is
eventually passed on to all drivers. See Campes, Mandatory Insurance Has a Mixed
Track Record, Chicago Tribune, June 26, 1988, § 4, at 1, col. 1; Beck, Mandatory Car
Insurance Doesn't Work, Chicago Tribune, June 6, 1988, § 1, at 14, col. 3 (written by Mr.
Beck in his capacity as President of the National Association of Independent Insurers).
137. See Laurino, Facts Back Mandatory Car Insurance, Chicago Tribune, June 20,
1988, § 1, at 12, col. 3 (written by State Representative William Laurino, Chairman of
the Illinois House of Representatives Committee on Insurance and a sponsor of House
Bill 3900).
138. 1988 Ill. Legis. Serv. 85-1201 (West) (to be codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
95 1/2, para. 7-601).
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tension would require passage of a new bill by the Illinois General
Assembly with the approval of the Governor. Thus, the issue once
again will be subject to a full debate, at the center of which will
surely be the statistical results of Illinois' four-year experiment.
VII. CONCLUSION
Of the many issues arising during the Survey year, the passage of
the new mandatory automobile insurance law stands out as having
potentially the greatest long-term impact. The Survey year also in-
cluded several significant judicial decisions. The Illinois Supreme
Court resolved an important controversy regarding the priority
status of reinsureds during liquidation proceedings. Also of note
were appellate court decisions refining the scope of the pollution
exclusion and narrowing the application of the product exclusion
in the CGL policy. Finally, although the Illinois Supreme Court
decisions regarding underinsured motorist coverage and premium
due notice requirements are unlikely to have a direct impact on
many future cases, both cases demonstrate the court's restrained
approach to the interpretation of the Insurance Code.
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